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court to 
Aside the Default Judgment. R. pp. 215 -219. 
The 1992 Harley Davidson Motorcycle was seized on May 2014, by the 
Bon._rieville County Sheriffs Office as a conveyance in violation ofldaho Code§ 37-
2701 et. seq. R. pp 6 - 9. The County timely filed a complaint on May 29th, 2014 and 
served the same on Appellant together with a summons the same day at the Bonneville 
County Jail. R. p. 2. 
Hearing nothing from Appellant, Bonneville County filed for default 21 days later 
on June 19, 2015, sending a copy of the default paperwork to Appellant. R. p. 10-16. 
Thereafter, on or about June 24, 2014, presumably after receiving the default 
paperwork, Appellant filed an objection to the default (dated June 20, 2014), still failing 
to answer the Complaint. R. p. 17 - 18; Tr. p. 27: 11 - 13. 
A judgment was entered after a default hearing on July 8, 2015. R. p. 34-36. 
After the hearing, Appellant filed an Answer, but neither the Court nor opposing counsel 
received a copy of the same until after the default hearing and until after the Default 
Judgment had been entered. R. p. 34 39. 
Appellant contended that his failure to respond was a permissible mistake because 
he believed he had 20 business days to respond and further he was rearrested 
approximately three days before the default hearing and allegedly could not have 
responded in a timely fashion. Tr. p. 17:9 -25. 
Both the magistrate and district court disagreed holding this error did not 
constitute a "mistake" or "excusable neglect" under I.R.C.P. 60(b). Appellant filed this 
appeal alleging that a lack of a criminal conviction constituted a meritorious defense but 
he fails to appeal both courts' holdings that he did not meet a requirement of Rule 60(b). 
Accordingly, he does not meet the burden of a motion to set aside and the holding of the 
lower courts should be affirmed. 
V 
a default judgment in a civil forfeiture proceeding? 
• Appellant fails to allege the lower courts abused their discretion related to a 
requirement of of Rule 60(b) and the holding of the lower courts should therefore 
be affirmed. 
• Appellant further raises new issues on appeal which should be disregarded by this 
Court. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A default judgment only be set aside upon Appellant showing the lower court 
abused its discretion: 
Where discretionary grounds are invoked for relief from a 
judgment, the standard of review is abuse of discretion. 
Knight Ins., Inc. v. Knight, 109 Idaho 56, 704 P.2d 960 
(Ct.App.1985). Whether a court has abused its discretion in 
ruling on a motion to set aside a judgment requires a 
determination of whether: (1) [t]he trial court made 
findings of fact which were not clearly erroneous; (2) the 
court applied the proper criteria under I.R.C.P. 60(b); and 
(3) the court's legal conclusions followed logically from the 
application of such criteria to the facts found. Bull v. Leake, 
109 Idaho 1044, 712 P.2d 745 (Ct.App.1986). 
Golay v. Loomis, 118 Idaho 387,390, 797 P.2d 95, 98 (1990). In this case, Appellant 
fails to show either the magistrate court or district court abused their discretion and his 
appeal should be denied. Accord Idaho State Police ex rel. Russell v. Real Prop. Situated 
in Cty. of Cassia, 144 Idaho 60, 62, 156 P.3d 561, 563 (2007). 
VI 
I. CRIMINAL CONVICTION IS NOT A REQUIREMENT OF 
FORFEITURE THEREFORE 
DOES EXIST, 
This Court properly denied Appellant's attempt to have this Court take judicial 
notice of and further consider the outcome of the related crime. In response to 
Appellant's request, the County reasoned as follows: 
Appellant suggests that civil forfeitures must be held in limbo until a 
disposition on a criminal proceeding is obtained. However, I.C. § 37-
2744(c)(3) and (d) suggest otherwise, requiring a civil complaint be filed 
within thirty (30) days of the seizure. Further, the statute makes no 
mention that the outcome of a civil forfeiture is contingent on the outcome 
of the criminal proceeding. 
In fact, this Court has held that civil forfeitures are civil proceedings 
completely separate from criminal proceedings and bear an entirely 
different burden of proof. Even if the criminal charges were dismissed by 
the criminal prosecutor under Appellant's assumption that he/she could 
not prove guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt", the standard of proof in a 
civil forfeiture proceeding is a lesser one of "preponderance of the 
evidence". See State v. }JcGough, 129 Idaho 371, 374 (1996): 
Similarly, forfeiture procedures in Idaho are distinct 
from the criminal prosecution. Idaho Code Section 37-
2744( d) provides in part: 'Forfeiture proceedings shall 
be civil actions against the property subject to forfeiture 
and the stand of proof shall be preponderance of the 
evidence.' The statute indicates that the Idaho 
legislature's intent was to make the forfeiture 
proceedings civil in nature. 
With different burdens of proof and the requirement of separate case 
filings, the civil proceedings cannot be contingent on the disposition of the 
criminal proceedings. Therefore, the introduction of additional documents 
showing the dismissal of a criminal complaint is not relevant to this 
appeal. 
Emphasis added See Respondent's Objection to Motion to Take Judicial Notice and 
Objection to Motion to Augment dated January 19, 2016. This Court agreed and 
denied evidence of the criminal outcome. See Order Denying Judicial Notice and 
Motion to Augment dated February 3, 2016. 
Even if this Cow-t were to take judicial notice of Appellant's criminal outcome, 
Appellant's contention that a criminal conviction is necessary for a civil forfeiture 
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§ 
Moreover, this Court were to adopt position, 
statute, such would empower criminals to use plea bargains as 
to 
for dismissal 
of civil forfeitures. A plea bargain or even a dismissal of a case may occur for any 
number of reasons including a dismissal of a lesser charge for conviction of a greater one, 
an expeditious conviction, an exchange for cooperation of the criminal defendant in 
another criminal matter, or where the evidence may meet the standard of preponderance 
of the evidence but not beyond a reasonable doubt. None of these scenarios mean a 
controlled substance violation (I.C. § 37-2701 et seq.) did not take place nor that a 
forfeiture would be inappropriate under a preponderance of the evidence standard. The 
legislature wisely recognized the need to set a different standard of proof to prevent abuse 
of the system that would restore the instrumentalities and proceeds of crimes to criminals 
those violating the controlled substances statutes. 
Notably, neither I.C. § 37-2744 nor I.C. § 37-2744A mention the need for a 
criminal conviction, nor even the need for filing of a criminal complaint for a forfeiture to 
take place. The civil forfeiture is its own proceeding. Additionally, making the civil and 
criminal forfeitures contingent on each other can lead to the temptation to leverage the 
dismissal of a civil forfeiture in exchange for a criminal conviction or vice versa. The 
two actions must remain independent of each other to ensure each case is treated fairly 
under its own burden of proof. 
This is not to say that a prosecutor may occasionally elect to dismiss a civil 
forfeiture if a defendant's innocence becomes abundantly clear before a judgment is 
entered in the forfeiture proceeding, nor does it mean that a prosecutor and respondent 
cannot agree to stay the civil proceedings and await the disposition of a criminal 
proceeding. However, each of these scenarios require voluntary consent of the 
prosecutor and neither is required by the statute. 
Additionally, the outcome of the criminal case and the civil were 
necessarily tied together, defendants could abstain from presenting a defense altogether 




ultimate criminal disposition is not before this or 
court below. Counsel for Respondent did not stay abreast of the criminal proceedings. 
The transcript regarding Respondent's knowledge of the status of the criminal 
proceedings is incorrect--citing Mr. Davis for Mr. William's response. Tr. pp. 41:15-
19.1 Further, the magistrate did not find that Mr. \Villiams had a meritorious defense; 
instead he stated that Mr. Williams, "may" have a meritorious defense, but because be 
could not find in favor of Appellant on Rule 60(b )(1 ), that analysis would not be 
necessary. Id. at pp. 41 :20-42:4. Notably, Appellant has never pled any facts that 
would constitute a meritorious defense, instead relying wholly on the status of the 
underlying criminal act, which is not in the record of the Court. 
Because a criminal conviction is not a prerequisite to a civil forfeiture judgment, a 
meritorious defense does not exist and therefore the holdings of the lower courts should 
be affirmed. 
II. THE JUDGMENT MUST BE AFFIRIVIED WHERE APPELLANT 
FAILED TO ALLEGE ON APPEAL THAT HE MET A 
REQUIREMENT OF RULE 60(b). 
Even if the Court were to somehow rule a meritorious defense exists, which it 
should not, Appellant must also show the facts surrounding the default meet a 
requirement of Rule 60(b). See Baldwin v. Baldwin, 114 Idaho 525, 527 - 528, 757 P.2d 
1244, 1246 - 1247 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that to set aside a default judgment, the 
movant must show (1) he meets a requirement of Rule 60(b ); (2) he has a meritorious 
defense; and (3) he acted with reasonable diligence in moving to set aside the judgment). 
He must meet all three prongs to set aside the default. 
On appeal, Appellant fails to demonstrate or even allege how the judges abused 
their discretion in holding that he had not met the requirements of l.R.C.P. 60(b) and the 
holding of the lower courts should therefore be affirmed. 
1 Counsel for Respondent was not provided a copy of the hearing transcripts until 
days ago) and was therefore unaware of this error to correct the transcript. 
3 
2016 two 
to as meet 
three requirements a motion to set aside under Rule 60(b ). 
Even though Appellant is held to the same standards as an attorney, out of an 
abundance of precaution hmvever, and without \Vaiving any objection that Appellant has 
failed to raise an abuse of discretion on appeal as it relates to Rule 60(b ), the County 
argues as follows: 
"The district court is deemed to have acted within its discretion if it applies the 
governing legal standards to the facts in a logical manner while keeping in mind the 
disfavored status of default judgments." Bach v. }vfiller, 148 Idaho 549, 552, 224 P.3d 
1138, 1141 (2010). In this case, Appellant fails to show how either the district court or 
magistrate court abused their discretion as it relates to Rule 60(b ). 
A. The Lower Courts Correctlv Held Appellant Committed a Mistake of 
Law, Not of Fact. 
Appellant argued below that his failure to comprehend the laws of the State of 
Idaho and that he believed he had twenty (20) business days to answer the complaint 
instead of twenty (20) days constituted a mistake under Rule 60(b ). Respondent briefed 
this issue for the magistrate and district court. For ease of reference, Respondent 
incorporates said argument as follows: 
To set aside a default judgment, the "mistake" alleged must be one of fact 
and not oflaw. Hearst Corp. v. Keller, 100 Idaho 10, 592 P.2d 66 (1979). 
A mistake of fact, is generally not one requiring a legal reading or 
interpretation of the law and not the type of mistake in this case. For 
example, the Idaho Supreme Court has found a mistake of fact exists 
where an essential witness fails to appear to a trial on time when the 
witness was notified that the trial would occur four hours later than the 
time it was actually scheduled. Nelson v. Property Management Services, 
105 Idaho 578, 671 P.2d 1071 (1983). A mistake of fact was also found 
where a plaintiff took default against a defendant who took the complaint 
to an attorney for representation, and the attorney did not clearly inform 
the defendant prior to the default that the attorney had not agreed to 
represent the defendant. Idaho State Police, 156 P.3d at 563. In those 




(2007). Appellant's claimed "mistake" not understanding 
twenty (20) days to respond to include non-business days is a mistake of 
law. However, the failure to read the applicable statute or rule, or the 
misinterpretation thereof constitutes a mistake of law. Washington 
Federal Savings and Loan Association v. TransAmerica Premier 
Insurance Company, 124 Idaho 913, 865 P.2d 1004, 1008 (Ct. App. 1993). 
"Ignorance of the law or rules of procedure are generally inexcusable." Id. 
124 Idaho at 917, 865 P.2d at 1008. Ignorance of the law can easily be 
remedied by seeking the assistance of legal counsel and for such reason, a 
mistake of law is not sufficient to set aside a judgment. Id. 124 Idaho at 
918, 865 P.2d at 1009. 
To illustrate a mistake of law, the Supreme Court of Idaho has held that a 
defendant's mistaken belief that he could present testimony at a summary 
judgment hearing under Rule 43, instead of timely filing a verified 
statement in the court record to contradict plaintiff's motion, constituted a 
mistake of law, and such mistake was insufficient to set aside the 
judgment. Golay, supra. Similarly, the Idaho Court of Appeals has held a 
mistake of law exists where a defendant confused Idaho's 20 day period to 
respond stated in the summons with the 30 day period to respond in the 
defendant's home state of California. Gro-Mor, Inc. v. Butts, 109 Idaho 
1020, 712 P.2d 721 (Ct. App. 1985). In that case, the default judgment 
was not set aside. Id. The Court of Appeals further held that a 
defendant's failure to understand the starting date of the 20 day period in 
the summons is the date of service, not on the date of an agent's receipt, 
constitutes a mistake of law and is an insufficient mistake to set aside a 
default judgment. Washington Federal Savings, supra. 
R. p. 185 - 186. Emphasis Added. 
The magistrate judge correctly agreed with Respondent. Tr. p. 39:10-17. The 
district court made a similar finding: 
William's mistake is a clear mistake of law, as the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure do not distinguish between business days and non-business 
days, except when the fin~l day to file an answer is on a weekend on 
holiday. I.R.C.P. 6(a). Because Williams mistake was a mistake of law, 
he cannot be granted relief of default judgment under the theory of 
mistake under 60(b)(l). The magistrate did not err or abuse its discretion 
in reaching this conclusion. 
R. p. 198 - 199. 
5 
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B. The Court Acted Within Its Discretion In Holding Appellant's Failure to 
Respond in a Timely Fashion Did Not Constitute Excusable Neglect. 
Appellant's failure to respond in a timely manner did not constitute "excusable 
neglect." "Excusable neglect" invokes a "reasonably prudent person under the 
circumstances" standard on those that neglect their responsibilities. Washington Federal 
Savings, 124 Idaho at 915-16, 865 P.2d at 1006-07. In other words, this is not simply a 
neglect standard, but an excusable neglect standard. The same standard of 
reasonableness is imposed on those committing a "mistake" of fact; the law does not 
condone willful ignorance. Newboldv. Arvidson, 105 Idaho 663,664,672 P.2d 231,232 
(1983) disapproved of on other grounds by Shelton v. Diamond Int'! Corp., 108 Idaho 
935, 703 P.2d 699 (1985). Prose litigants are held to the same standards as an attorney. 
Golay, 118 Idaho at 392, 797 P.2d at 100. 
In this case, the magistrate correctly recognized this standard and applied it in a 
logical manner in light of the default: 
[ ... ] In looking at excusable neglect, the Court has to look at what a 
reasonable person would have done in similar circumstances. And I will 
readily admit that that is a difficult task because of the incarceration aspect 
of this because that doesn't happen very often in people's lives where 
they're in custody, in and out of custody, while these types of things are 
happening. The general population involved in civil cases don't have jail 
as an issue. So it's certainly an exacerbating factor for Mr. Williams. 
However, the Court notes that from June 2 through June I St\ that Mr. 
Williams was not in custody and had a significant period of time, 13 days 
in that period of time, in which he very well could have filed an answer, 
sought legal advice, or taken any action that he chose to have taken at that 
time, including getting replacement documents if he needed them. After 
he's rearrested on the 151\ he still has a few days. And again, with an 
asset of this nature, it would seem that that would be a high priority to 
get the - to get an answer made. 
And so I look at those facts and as I weigh them, I can't say that the 
incarceration in and of itself raises this matter to the level of excusable 
neglect. And so I'll find that there's not excusable neglect based on 
that finding. 
6 
to save his motorcycle. When the County learned that Appellant no longer had a copy of 
the pleadings, the County immediately sent a copy of the same to Appellant. pp. 7:24 
- 8:3, 31: 19 23; R. p. 19 - 20. Mr. Davis did not learn Appellant did not have these 
documents or even that he was rearrested until after the County had already filed for 
default. 
The district court similarly held as follows: 
In this case, Williams misunderstood his legal obligation, and made 
mistakes of law. Although unfamiliar with the rules of civil procedure, 
Williams had a duty to seek out legal counsel or educate himself as to his 
responsibilities. The magistrate court did not err or abuse its discretion in 
concluding that there was no excusable neglect. 
R. p. 200. Both courts applied the governing law to the facts in a logical manner hence 
there was no abuse of discretion. Appellant must show the decision of the courts below 
did not flow logically from the facts. He has failed to do so or even allege this issue. 
III. ISSUES RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL SHOULD NOT 
BE CONSIDERED. 
Appellant alleges for the first time on appeal that Respondent failed to timely 
object to Appellant's Motion to Set Aside the Default and failed to raise affirmative 
defenses. This issue was not raised below. "This Court's longstanding rule is that it will 
not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal." Unifund CCR, LLC v. Lowe, 159 
Idaho 750, 367 P.3d 145, 150 (2016) citing KEB Enters., L.P. v. Smedley, 140 Idaho 746, 
752, 101 P.3d 690, 696 (2004). This issue should therefore not be considered by this 
Court. 
Out of an abundance of caution, and in no way waiving the argument set forth 
above, I.R.C.P. 12 applies to answers to complaints and summonses, not to objections 
and responses to motions to set aside. Instead, I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(E) applies to responses to 
motions, requiring a response seven (7) days prior to the hearing. In this case, the 
hearing on Motion to Set Aside was held on September 11, 2014. Respondent filed its 
objection 7 days prior to the hearing on September 2014. Respondent's objection was 
timely. 
7 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES 
Attorney fees will be awarded against a pro se appellant who brought or pursued 
the appeal frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. King v. Lang, 136 Idaho 905, 
42 P.3d 698 (2002); Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 973 P.2d 142 (1999). 
This appeal is nothing more than a request that the appellate court second-guess 
the magistrate and district courts. Appellant has set forth no basis upon which the lower 
courts abused their discretion. Appellant fails to allege on appeal that the courts erred in 
ruling a requirement of Rule 60(b) was not met. Without this critical ruling being 
reversed, even a reversal on a meritorious defense (if successful) does not meet the 
standard to set aside a judgment. 
Furthermore, this Court has already ruled that civil forfeitures are independent of 
the criminal actions, and therefore a meritorious defense cannot exist. State v. }vfcGough, 
129 Idaho 371,374 (1996). Additionally, the plain language of the state imposing a 
different standard of proof clearly demonstrates the frivolous, unreasonable, and 
foundationless nature of Appellant's argument. 
Accordingly, attorneys fees should be granted on behalf of Respondent for having 
to respond to this appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 41 and I. C. § § 117, 121, and 123 where 
Appellant fails to appeal with a reasonable basis in law or fact. 
CONCLUSION 
The holding of the magistrate and district courts should be affirmed where the 
failure to be convicted of the underlying crime does not constitute a meritorious defense. 
Further, the holding should be affirmed where the courts below clearly acted within their 
discretion and Appellant asks this court to do nothing more than second guess their 
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I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the 
following this 2ih day of April, 2016, by hand delivery, mailing with the necessary 
postage affixed thereto, facsimile, or overnight mail. 
Cody M. Williams 
#56970 ISCI Unit 9 
P.O. Box 14 
Boise, ID 83707 
~]Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] E-Mail 
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CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL COMPLIANCE 
The undersigned does hereby certify that the electronic brief submitted is in 
compliance with all of the requirements set out in LA.R. 34.1. However, an electronic 
brief cannot be served on Appellant where Respondent is not aware of Appellant's email 
address, has not previously appeared electronically, and where he is incarcerated and 
perhaps will not have ready access to email. This electronic copy is submitted for 
convenience of the Court. A hard copy has been sent to this Court and to Appellant so as 
to ensure both the Court and Appellant receive a hard copy within the timeframe set forth 
by I.A.R. 34. 
DATED and CERTIFIED this 27th day of April, 2016 
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